Repair operations in erasure-coded distributed storage systems involve a lot of data movement. This can potentially expose data to malicious acts of passive eavesdroppers or active adversaries, putting security of the system at risk. This paper presents coding schemes and repair algorithms that ensure security of the data in the presence of passive eavesdroppers and active adversaries while maintaining high availability, reliability, and resource efficiency in the system. The proposed codes are optimal in that they meet previously proposed lower bounds on storage and network-bandwidth requirements for a wide range of system parameters. The results thus establish the secure storage capacity of such systems. The proposed codes are based on an optimal class of codes called productmatrix codes. The constructions presented for security from active adversaries provide an additional appealing feature of "on-demand security," where the desired level of security can be chosen separately for each instance of repair, and the proposed algorithms remain optimal simultaneously for all possible security levels. This paper also provides necessary and sufficient conditions governing the transformation of any (non-secure) code into one providing on-demand security.
and available in the face of these failures. One means of introducing redundancy is via replication. However, replication is inefficient with respect to storage space utilization, and thus in order to scale economically, data centers are increasingly turning to the use of erasure coding as a far more efficient option [5] , [6] .
Consider a distributed storage system with n storage nodes across which some data (termed the message) is to be stored. Each of these n nodes stores only a fraction of the data. In order to provide reliability and availability, the erasure codes considered in this paper ensure that a user (termed a data collector) must be able to recover the message from the data stored in any k of the n nodes. This property is called data reconstruction or simply reconstruction. The reconstruction property provides the storage system a capability of tolerating failures of any (n − k) of the n nodes.
Upon failure of a storage node, a replacement node is designated to store the data that was stored previously in the failed node. The replacement node recovers this data by downloading (a part of) the data stored in the remaining nodes. This is termed a node-repair or simply a repair operation. Traditional erasure codes typically handle repair by first downloading and reconstructing the entire message and then extracting the required data from it. Such an operation is quite wasteful of the network resources [4] , [7] [8] [9] , and several recent works [7] - [30] propose new erasure codes and repair algorithms addressing this issue.
Security is an important aspect of distributed storage systems, and this is underscored by the many incidents of data compromise in the recent past (e.g., [31] [32] [33] ). This paper considers the problem of designing codes and algorithms for distributed storage that ensure security in addition to maintaining other properties such as reliability, availability and efficiency. We consider the information-theoretic notion of security (and not the computational notion), making no assumption about the computational power of the adversary.
In designing a secure distributed storage system, special attention must be given to the repair operations since they can pose security hazards. For instance, in a system using traditional erasure codes, the repair of a failed node would require the download of the entire data at the replacement node. An eavesdropper tapping onto the replacement node can thus obtain the entire data. Alternatively, during repair of a failed node, an active adversary that has captured one or more of the remaining nodes may pass corrupt data. Such an action would corrupt the data stored in the replacement node, and 0018-9448 © 2017 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information. these errors may then propagate across the entire system during subsequent repairs of other nodes. This makes repair operations a serious security threat, and motivates the goal of this paper. Fig. 1 illustrates the problem of security under repair dynamics using a toy example of a Reed-Solomon code with n = 4 and k = 2. The code stores the message {a, b} across four nodes, where both a and b belong to the finite field F 5 . It is easy to verify that the entire message can be recovered by downloading the data stored in any k = 2 of the four nodes. On failure of any node, the replacement node connects to any two other nodes, downloads all data stored in them, from which the replacement node recovers the data stored in the node prior to failure. Fig. 1a illustrates a setting with passive eavesdroppers. Specifically, consider an eavesdropper who can read all the data stored in node 1. Under the Reed-Solomon code, the eavesdropper can gain access to the symbol a. Furthermore, if the eavesdropper is also able to listen to the data passed during any repair operation, then it gains access to the entire message. Fig. 1b illustrates a setting with active adversaries. Suppose an active adversary gains access to one of the nodes, say node 3, and suppose the repair of node 1 is performed by connecting to nodes 2 and 3. Then, as seen in the figure, the adversary can pass malicious data in the repair process (for instance, (a + b + 1) instead of (a + b)), making the replacement node to erroneously store (a +1) instead of a. This error, in turn, propagates during further repairs, and also sabotages all subsequent reconstruction operations involving node 1.
In this paper, we model the distributed storage system based on the regenerating codes model introduced by Dimakis et al. [34] . In addition to the parameters n and k introduced earlier, this model has a third parameter d. Upon failure of a node, the replacement node may connect to any d of the remaining nodes, and should be able to recover the data that was stored previously in the failed node by downloading a minimal amount of data from these d nodes.
It was shown in [34] that there is a tradeoff between the total amount of data stored per node and that downloaded for repair of a failed node, and this is described in greater detail in Section II-A. The two extreme regimes in the tradeoff are the minimim storage regenerating (MSR) and the minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) regimes. The MSR regime aims to minimize the amount of storage required per node, and for this minimum amount of storage, the amount of data download during repairs is minimized. On the other hand, the MBR regime aims to keep the amount of data download during repairs at absolute minimum, and for this minimum amount of data download, the amount of storage consumed is minimized.
The initial work [34] on regenerating codes considers the repair to be 'functional', wherein a replacement node need not be identical to the failed node, but should only satisfy further reconstructions and repairs. A strictly stronger and practical requirement is that of 'exact' repair, where the replacement node must obtain and store data identical to that in the failed node. Throughout this paper, we consider only exact repair.
The threat model considered in this paper is an extension of the threat model proposed in [35] for the regenerating codes setup. Two classes of threats are considered in this paper:
• Security from passive eavesdroppers: This threat class involves preventing leakage of any information about the data to passive eavesdroppers who may gain access to a subset of the storage nodes. By 'passive' we mean that the eavesdropper may read and store any data it gains access to, but does not corrupt any data. In our threat model, two parameters and m determine the level of security to be provided: the goal is to ensure that a passive eavesdropper having access to the data stored in any of the nodes and additionally to the data downloaded for repair in any m of these nodes, gains zero information about the message. • Security from active (malicious) adversaries: This threat class involves ensuring that the presence of an adversary who gains access to a subset of the storage nodes and may actively corrupt the data does not affect the operation of the system. The active adversary may corrupt the data stored in a subset of storage nodes and also pass erroneous data to other nodes during repair operations.
In particular, for some parameter p determining the level of security to be provided, the goal is to guard against p nodes being corrupted by an active adversary. In such a scenario, if a replacement node (or a data-collector) connects to any of the p corrupt nodes, then these corrupt nodes could pass arbitrary data in the repair (or datareconstruction) operation. The goal here is to successfully accomplish the node-repair and data-reconstruction operations even in the presence of such an attack. In this paper, we present explicit codes for distributed storage at MSR and MBR points that ensure security of the data from passive eavesdroppers and/or active adversaries. These code constructions are based on the product-matrix framework [12] . The secure codes presented for the MBR point are applicable for all values of the parameters [n, k, d], and the secure codes presented for the MSR point are applicable for all values of the parameters satisfying d ≥ 2k − 2.
The secure codes presented have two attractive features:
• Optimality: The proposed secure codes are optimal for a wide range of parameter settings, that is, they meet the lower bounds on the amount of storage and network requirements established in [35] . The codes for security from active adversaries and from passive eavesdroppers at the MBR point are optimal for all values of the parameters. The codes for security from active adversaries at the MSR point are optimal for all parameters satisfying d ≥ (2k − 2). The codes for security from passive eavesdroppers at the MSR point are optimal for all parameters satisfying d ≥ (2k − 2) with m ≤ 1. The codes presented in this paper, thus, establish the secure storage capacity in these regimes. • On-demand security from active adversaries: Under the proposed code constructions, when dealing with active adversaries, the level of security p does not have to be fixed a priori and can be chosen flexibly at "run-time" when any repair or reconstruction operation is being executed. The level of security p can be chosen separately and independently for each instance of repair or reconstruction. This "on-demand" security endows the system with the advantage of not having to preset the security level and associated system resources for the worst case. This is in contrast to the traditional models of information-theoretic security (e.g., [35] ) that take a "static" approach towards system design where the price is paid, in terms of the reduction in the size of the message stored, corresponding to the magnitude of the "worst-case" security level required. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that the proposed codes do not require any additional storage to support this on-demand property, and are optimal for all values of p simultaneously. The problem at hand is closely related to the problem of secure network coding [36] [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] . The literature on secure network coding primarily considers a multicast setting where one or more receivers wish to obtain the entire data that was transmitted. The threat models typically consider the scenario of link compromise in the networks. The problem we consider, on the other hand, falls into the harder non-multicast setting [36] , and furthermore, needs to handle the harder case of adversaries or eavesdroppers being able to capture nodes in the network [42] . The results of this paper thus establish the capacity of a class of non-multicast networks in the presence of active adversaries or passive eavesdroppers having the ability to compromise nodes. Interestingly, the capacity-achieving codes that are proposed in this paper are linear, deterministic and explicit.
While the primary focus of this paper is informationtheoretic security, the results of this paper also are also relevant to other applications such as correcting network errors and erasures and for reducing latency of "degraded reads" in data centers. These applications are discussed in more detail in Section II-D.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II formalizes the system model, and describes our approach towards the code construction problem. Some additional applications of the proposed codes are also discussed in this section. Section III describes related literature. The codes presented in this paper build upon our previously proposed productmatrix framework [12] , and this framework is overviewed in Section IV. Section V and Section VI present explicit constructions of MBR codes that provide security from active adversaries and from passive eavesdroppers respectively. Section VII and Section VIII present explicit construction of MSR codes that provide security from active adversaries and from passive eavesdroppers respectively. Section IX provides necessary and sufficient conditions governing the transformation of any (non-secure) erasure code into one providing on-demand security. Section X presents a concluding discussion.
II. SYSTEM MODEL, APPROACH, AND SUMMARY OF THE RESULTS
We will first describe the system model in the absence of security requirements (the 'regenerating codes' model), following which we describe the extension that incorporates the provision of security. Alongside, we also describe our approach towards constructing secure distributed storage codes, and a summary of the results of this paper.
A. Regenerating Codes Model (in the Absence of Security Requirements)
Under the regenerating codes model [34] , the system comprises of n storage nodes, across which data comprising of B symbols is to be stored. This set of B symbols is called the message, and each of these symbols is assumed to belong to a finite field F q of size q. Each of the n storage nodes has a capacity of storing α symbols. The data is to be stored such that a user (termed data-collector) can recover the entire message by downloading the data stored in any k of these n nodes. This process is termed data-reconstruction, or simply reconstruction. It follows that any system satisfying the reconstruction property can tolerate the failure of any (n − k) storage nodes without losing any data. Now let us consider the repair operation. When a storage node fails, it is replaced by another node, called the replacement node, that stores exactly the same data as the failed node. The regenerating codes model contains two additional parameters, d and β, that are associated to the repair operation. The replacement node is permitted to connect to any d (≥ k) nodes out of the remaining (n − 1) nodes while downloading β (≤ α) symbols from each node. This set of d nodes are termed the helper nodes for this instance of repair. From the set of dβ symbols thus obtained, the replacement node must recover the α symbols that were stored in the failed node.
The total amount dβ of data downloaded for repair purposes is termed the repair bandwidth. 1 It is shown in [34] that the parameters associated with a regenerating code must necessarily satisfy the bound
(1)
Since both storage and bandwidth come at a cost, it is naturally desirable to minimize both α as well as dβ, and try to achieve the bound (1) with equality, i.e.,
It can be deduced (see [34] ) that achieving (2) (2) is satisfied, and (b) if either α or β is decreased, (2) fails to hold. Two important regimes of this tradeoff are its extremities, termed the minimum bandwidth regenerating (MBR) and minimum storage regenerating (MSR) regimes, described below.
1) Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) Regime: Note that if β < α d (i.e., if α > dβ), the parameter α can be decreased without violating (2) . Hence the parameters of an optimal regenerating code must necessarily satisfy
The Minimum Bandwidth Regenerating (MBR) regime corresponds to the case when β takes the minimum value, i.e.,
Substituting this value of dβ in (2) gives
The MBR regime entails the minimum possible repairbandwidth: the amount of data downloaded by a replacement node is no more than the amount of data that was stored in the failed node.
2) Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) Regime: When α < (d − (k − 1))β, the parameter β can be decreased without violating (2) . Hence the parameters of an optimal regenerating code must necessarily satisfy
The Minimum Storage Regenerating (MSR) regime corresponds to the case when α takes the minimum value,
Substituting this value of α into (2) gives
The MSR regime allows for the minimum possible storage capacity: the requirement of being able to recover all B message symbols from any k nodes mandates the storage per node to be at least B k . Any code operating in the MSR regime is thus Maximum-Distance-Separable (MDS).
The two extremities of the tradeoff curve have been wellstudied in the literature, and there exist several explicit codes [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] , [19] , [20] operating in these regimes and achieving (2) for exact repair. On the other hand, it is shown in [13] that at essentially all other points on the tradeoff curve, there cannot exist any codes that satisfy (2) for exact repair. Tighter outer bounds have been proposed for these intermediate points on the tradeoff curve [45] [46] [47] [48] .
Having described the basic setup of regenerating codes (in the absence of security), we will now present a description of the setting where security from passive eavesdroppers and/or active adversaries is required.
B. Security From Passive Eavesdroppers 1) Threat Model and Upper Bounds:
We consider a threat model that extends the model introduced in [35] . Under the model we consider, a passive eavesdropper may gain access to the data stored in a subset of the storage nodes, and possibly also to the data downloaded during repair of some of these nodes. We assume that the eavesdropper may possess unbounded computational power and has complete knowledge of the system protocol. It is required that such an eavesdropper should not be able to obtain any knowledge (in the information-theoretic sense) about the message.
An eavesdropper can gain read-access to the data stored in any arbitrary set of at most (< k) storage nodes. In addition, the eavesdropper may also listen to the data downloaded during (any number of) repair operations of some arbitrary subset of m (≤ ) of these nodes. We call such an eavesdropper an {, m}-eavesdropper, and term the security of data from such a passive eavesdropper as {, m}-security from the passive eavesdropper. Note that since the data passed to a node for repair also contains the data it will finally store, the setting described above can be equivalently stated in the following manner:
Definition 1 ({, m}-Security From the Passive Eavesdropper): A code provides {, m}-security from the passive eavesdropper if the mutual information between the following two quantities is zero: (a) the message and (b) the data obtained by a passive eavesdropper gaining access to only the data stored in any ( − m) nodes and the data passed for repair to any m nodes.
As an example of this model, consider a peer-to-peer storage system. The m nodes described above may represent nodes that are in a network belonging to the eavesdropper, thereby allowing the eavesdropper to listen to all the data downloaded when these m nodes undergo (possibly multiple) failures and repairs across time. On the other hand, the ( − m) nodes may represent the nodes which may be exposed only momentarily, allowing the eavesdropper access to only the data stored.
We now describe an upper bound on the size of the message that can be stored for any code under this system model. Pawar et al. [35] consider the setting of m = and provide an upper bound on the number of message symbols B * that can be stored in the information-theoretically secure system. It can be easily shown that this bound can be generalized to the setting of {, m}-security (the proof of the upper bound [35, Th. 1] works for any value of m (≤ ))). Using the bound from [35] for this setting, it follows that the parameters associated with any regenerating code providing {, m}-security from passive eavesdroppers must necessarily satisfy
Specializing to the MBR regime of α = dβ, this bound becomes
For the MSR regime, the bound in (9) turns out to be loose. Subsequent to the conference publication [1] of our code constructions for security from passive eavesdroppers, Rawat et al. [49] provide a tighter upper bound for the MSR regime:
2) Summary of Our Results for Passive Eavesdroppers: This paper provides explicit constructions for:
• MBR codes for all parameters [n, k, d], {, m} providing information-theoretic security from passive eavesdroppers. These codes are optimal for all values of the parameters.
{, m} providing information-theoretic security from passive eavesdroppers. These codes are optimal whenever m ≤ 1. The MBR code is optimal by virtue of meeting the outer bound (10) with equality. The MSR code is optimal for m ≤ 1 by virtue of meeting (11) .
The proposed codes thus establish the secure storage capacity of distributed storage systems for the case of passive eavesdroppers for all parameters at the MBR regime and for all [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] and m ≤ 1 at the MSR regime.
We take the following approach for constructing the codes. To construct a secure code for a given [n, k, d], we choose a product-matrix (PM) code with identical values of system parameters [n, k, d]. In the input to the PM code (without secrecy constraints), we replace a carefully chosen set of
message symbols with R random symbols, where B is obtained from (5) for the MBR case and from (7) for the MSR case, and B * is the number of messages that the code can store under the specified security requirement. Each of these random symbols are chosen uniformly and independently from F q , and are also independent of the message symbols. We then prove that this construction ensures that no {, m}-eavesdropper can obtain any information about the message, thus ensuring {, m}-security from passive eavesdroppers.
3) Example:
We illustrate our code construction with a toy example of an MBR code with [n = 3, k = 2, d = 2] providing { = 1, m = 1}-security from passive eavesdroppers. The code is shown in Fig. 2 . The message {a} is encoded and stored across n = 3 nodes in a manner that it can be recovered from any k = 2 of the nodes. The alphabet of operation is the finite field F 3 . Symbols r 1 and r 2 are drawn uniformly at random from F 3 . A failed node is repaired by downloading one symbol each from any d = 2 nodes. A passive eavesdropper gaining access to the data stored in any = 1 node and also to the data passed to that node during any of its repair operations (m = 1) gets zero information about the message. For instance, the repair of node 2 is shown in the figure, where one can see that the eavesdropper gains no information about a from the data stored in or passed to any one node. The code is optimal meaning that the amount of download required for any repair is the minimum possible, and furthermore, the amount of storage required in this setting is also minimum. Note that the rate of the code (i.e., the ratio of the size of the message to the total storage consumed) for general values of the parameters [n, k, d] is higher than that of this toy example.
C. Security From Active Adversaries 1) Threat Model and Upper Bounds:
We consider the threat model wherein one or more nodes may be compromised by an active adversary. The adversary is assumed to be computationally unbounded and possessing the knowledge of the entire protocol followed by the system. A node that is compromised by an active adversary may send arbitrarily corrupted data during any data-reconstruction or node-repair operation. It is required that the data-reconstruction operations complete successfully (without any errors) despite the presence of these active adversaries. This threat model was introduced in [35] . Note that this threat model does not require node repairs to be performed without errors, and only requires datareconstruction operations to be performed without errors.
The upper bound on the size of the message that can be securely stored under the above described threat model with at most p compromised nodes, as derived in [35] is
The proposed codes achieve this bound and also ensure that every repair operation is accomplished without any residual corruption.
Along the lines of traditional models of informationtheoretic security, [35] takes a "static" approach to securecode construction, wherein the size of the message stored is reduced by an amount proportional to the magnitude " p" of the required security level. In particular, the value of p chosen is typically based on worst-case estimation, which leads to considerable wastage of system resources during the normal operations. Furthermore, in the event that the number of nodes compromised is greater than that anticipated, the security level cannot be increased one-the-fly and hence security can no longer be guaranteed.
Our approach to secure data from active adversaries is different from the conventional approach that we just described. Under our approach, the message is encoded and stored independent of any security requirements, and all the security requirements are handled "on-demand" at the decoding stage by downloading additional data. Let us assume that at some point in time we estimate a requirement of protection from the compromise of any p out of the n nodes in the network. Under our approach, this value of p is not fixed at the time of encoding of the data, but possible corruptions are corrected by downloading additional data during the reconstruction or repair processes. Now, during a particular instance of reconstruction or repair, the amount of additional data downloaded is a function of the desired level of security p, and this level of security can be chosen independently for each reconstruction and repair operation. This provides the advantage of not having to allocate resources for the worst case. This approach also enables the system to function with dynamic levels of security, and hence there is no need to estimate and fix the parameter p beforehand: the system administrator is free to choose the desired level of security at runtime.
In our approach, the additional data downloaded for correcting possible corruptions is obtained by allowing a (greater) connectivity of (≥ d) nodes during repair and κ (≥ k) nodes during reconstruction. The parameters and κ depend on the desired level of security p as
Under this notation the outer bound of [35] translates to
Observe that substituting the values of κ and in terms of k and d from (14) in the bound (15) results in the bound (1) . It follows that achieving (15) with equality for all p is equivalent to achieving (1) with equality and satisfying (14) for all p. We continue to define the MSR and MBR regimes for the setting with the requirement of security from active adversaries in a manner identical to that under the regenerating codes model in the absence of security requirements (as discussed above in Section II-A). Thus achieving the outer bound (15) with equality for all p for the MBR regime amounts to satisfying equations (4), (5) , and (14) . Similarly, achieving the outer bound (15) with equality for all p for the MSR regime amounts to satisfying equations (7) , (8) , and (14) .
Remark 2: The above definitions of the MBR and MSR regimes for the setting with the requirement of security from active adversaries can also be obtained directly from (15) following an approach analogous to that discussed in Section II-A. That is, the MBR regime corresponds to parameters satisfying (15) with equality and
where the final equation follows from (14) . Similarly, the MSR regime corresponds to parameters satisfying (15) with equality and
where the final equation follows from (14) . Our goal is to construct codes which can secure the data from active adversaries for any value of the desired level of security p that can be chosen separately at each instance of repair or reconstruction. We also require that, in addition, the codes be optimal simultaneously for all values of p. We term this property on-demand security.
Definition 3 (On-Demand Security): A code is said to provide on-demand security if for any arbitrary (feasible) choice of p made at the time of a repair (or reconstruction) operation, the repair (or reconstruction) algorithm can detect and correct all corruptions in the presence of up to p compromised nodes.
Note that by all feasible values of p, we mean all values of p for which the additional connectivity requirement described in (14) can be satisfied (i.e., for all p such that (d + 2 p) ≤ (n − 1)).
Remark 4 (On-Demand Detection of Errors):
Note that the definition of on-demand security also requires detection of corruption, when up to p of the nodes are compromised during any repair (or reconstruction) operation. The corruption detection can be performed by connecting to (d + p) (or (k + p)) nodes and downloading β (or α) symbols from each of them during any repair (or reconstruction) operation as opposed to (d + 2 p) (or (k + 2 p)) nodes for correction of corruption. The error detection properties of the codes presented in this paper follow from their error correction properties in a straightforward manner using the basic relationship between detection Fig. 3 . MBR code with [n = 5, k = 2, d = 2] providing optimal and on-demand security. Repair of node 1 is shown when security from at most p = 1 compromised node is required. We can see that the repair operation proceeds successfully in spite of the presence of a compromised node that sends arbitrarily corrupted data. and correction of errors in block codes [50] . We hence focus only on the error correction in the rest of the paper, and the error detection properties follow as implicit corollaries.
In the proposed codes providing on-demand security, the parameters [n, k, d] and {β, α, B} remain fixed, while the values of and κ may vary during different instances of reconstruction or repair operations depending on the security level p desired at that time. Furthermore, the proposed codes achieve the bound (15) with equality for all values of p, and are hence optimal.
2) Summary of Our Results for Active Adversaries: This paper presents explicit constructions for:
• MBR codes for all parameters [n, k, d] providing on-demand security from active adversaries. The codes are optimal for all values of the parameters.
providing on-demand security from active adversaries. The codes are optimal for all values of the parameters. The optimality of the codes follows from the fact that the MBR codes satisfy the equations (4), (5) , and (14) for all values of the parameters, and the MSR codes satisfy the equations (7), (8) , and (14) with equality for all values of the parameters covered. 2 Our results thus establish the secure storage capacity of distributed storage systems for the case of active adversaries for the aforementioned parameter regimes.
3) Example: We illustrate our code construction with an example of an MBR code with [n = 5, k = 2, d = 2] providing optimal and on-demand security. The code is shown in Fig. 3 . The message {a, b, c} is encoded and stored across n = 5 nodes in a manner that it can be recovered from any k = 2 of the nodes. The alphabet of operation is the finite field F 5 . In the scenario that a repair operation needs to be made secure from the compromise of any p = 1 node, the replacement node connects to any 4 nodes and downloads one symbol from each as shown in the figure. Here, even in the presence of one arbitrary corruption (node 4 in the example), the desired symbols a and b are decoded correctly. When no security is required ( p = 0), a failed node is repaired by connecting to any d = 2 nodes and downloading one symbol from each of them: the symbol passed by any node is identical to what it would have passed in the p = 1 case. This code is optimal and provides on-demand security: a repair operation may choose the desired level of protection p at runtime and the amount of network-bandwidth consumed in either case is the minimum possible, and furthermore, the amount of storage required to support this amount of download is also minimum.
D. Other Applications
While the codes constructed in this paper are presented from the perspective of providing security in a distributed storage system, they can also be employed for other relevant applications.
1) Handling Packet Errors and Erasures in the Network: During a node-repair or a data-reconstruction operation, due to noise in the network, one or more packets downloaded may contain (arbitrary) errors. This is equivalent to a situation in the security scenario in which a set of nodes that are compromised by an active adversary may transmit corrupt packets. The codes for on-demand security from active adversaries can alternatively be employed for handling packet-errors and erasures in the network.
The codes for security can correct for packet erasures as well. In this case, a node-repair (or data-reconstruction) operation guarding against p errors and p erasures is carried out by downloading β (or α) symbols each from any arbitrary (d + 2 p + p ) (or k + 2 p + p ) nodes. An erasure of some p of these packets leaves us with data from some arbitrary subset of (d + 2 p) (or (k + 2 p)) nodes, p of which could be in error. This resultant scenario is identical to the setting of Section II-C, which is addressed by the proposed codes. The properties of on-demand security and optimality in the amount of download are also retained in the case of erasures.
2) Reducing Latency of Degraded Reads in Data Centers: The property of on-demand security can also aid in the reducing the latency of degraded reads in data centers. A degraded read (also called online repair) is an operation which is executed when a request comes in for data stored in a node that is busy or has failed. Under this operation, the request is met by downloading and recovering the requested data from the remaining nodes via a repair operation. Degraded reads are typically latency-sensitive, i.e., they must be served quickly.
If the underlying code provides on-demand security, then it allows for the degraded read operation to be executed faster in the following manner. Let f denote the busy/failed node that stores the requested data. Now, one could use the repair property of the erasure code to recover the required data from any d other nodes. However, due to various sources of randomness in the system such as congestion at the nodes and delay in transmission, the replies from these d nodes will typically arrive at different times. As a result, the net latency will be the maximum of the response-times of these d nodes. On the other hand, a code providing on-demand security allows a reduction in latency by means of sending 'redundant-requests' [51] [52] [53] [54] [55] [56] as follows. For some choice of a parameter r (d ≤ r ≤ n), connect to any r nodes and ask each of these nodes to aid in the 'repair' of node f . Since the code provides on-demand security, one can recover the data of node f (and hence serve the request) from the data obtained from the first d nodes that reply (the requests to the remaining nodes are then canceled). This lowers the latency of serving this request to the response time of the dth fastest among the r (d ≤ r ≤ n) helper nodes.
E. Notational Conventions
A vector will be treated as a column vector by default, and a row vector will be written as the transpose of the corresponding column vector. The transpose of a vector or a matrix will be denoted by a superscript T . The term 'randomly drawn' will mean 'drawn uniformly at random'.
III. RELATED LITERATURE

A. Codes for Distributed Storage
The 'regenerating codes' model introduced in [34] considers optimizing two important resources: the storage capacity required per node, and the repair-bandwidth. It was shown in [34] that there exists a tradeoff between these two resources, and lower bounds on their requirements were derived. Subsequent to the work of [34] , several explicit codes [10] [11] [12] [13] , [15] [16] [17] , [20] , [57] [58] [59] [60] [61] [62] have been constructed for the MSR and the MBR regimes of regenerating codes, many of which meet these bounds. Furthermore, it was shown in [13] , [45] , and [63] that the bounds are loose at essentially all points in the interior of the tradeoff curve.
A class of explicit codes that are optimal in terms of the storage and bandwidth requirements are the productmatrix codes proposed in [12] . The results of this paper are based on the product-matrix codes, and exploit certain unique features of the underlying product-matrix framework. A detailed description of the product-matrix codes is provided in Section IV.
The requirement of security in the presence of repair dynamics was first considered in [35] . Pawar et al. [35] provide lower bounds on the storage and bandwidth requirements under such a setting. Secure codes for the MBR regime with d = n − 1 are also provided, which are based on the repairby-transfer code of [10] and [13] . The codes of [35] providing security from active adversaries, also for the MBR regime with d = n − 1, allow propagation of the errors during the repair operation, and treat the resulting errors only at the reconstruction stage. Such a property may not be desirable in practice since the system administrators may not approve of allowing errors to linger around and propagate through the system. The secure codes presented in the present paper are applicable to any choice of the system parameters [n, k, d] in the MBR regime, and any [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] in the MSR regime. Furthermore, the proposed codes ensure the correction of errors during every individual repair and the reconstruction operation. While this additional requirement clearly makes the system more practical, we show that surprisingly, this more stringent requirement does not necessitate any additional storage or bandwidth requirements.
Subsequent to the initial presentation of the proposed codes in [1] , there have been several other works on information theoretic security in distributed storage systems with repair considerations [49] , [64] [65] [66] [67] [68] [69] [70] [71] [72] . Rawat et al. [49] consider security from passive eavesdroppers and present outer bounds for the MSR setting that are tighter than those proposed in [35] . Tamo et al. [16] also present a secure MSR code construction for d = n − 1 which employs Zigzag codes along with a maximum rank distance code. These codes are optimal for d = n − 1, m ≤ 2. Goparaju et al. [65] provide a tighter upper bound on the file size that can be stored in a system secure from passive eavesdroppers for codes employing linear encoding and decoding at the MSR point. The code construction provided in [49] meets the upper bound for linear codes provided in [65] for d = n − 1. Shao et al. [72] show that the trade-off curve between storage capacity and repair bandwidth under the requirement of security from eavesdroppers have multiple corner points.
Security from active adversaries is considered in [64] . A different adversarial model, where an active adversary can replace the content of an affected node only once, is considered and bounds and achievable schemes for this setting are provided. The paper also considers the MSR setting providing security from an active adversary who can replace the contents of affected nodes an unbounded number of times, and provides schemes that are optimal for a specific choice of the parameters. Tandon et al. [66] provide information theoretic upper bounds for the cases n ≤ 4 and k = d = n − 1. For these parameters, it is shown that MBR is the one and only regime for which the resource requirements in the system do not increase when, in addition to security from an eavesdropper being able to read data stored in nodes, security from an eavesdropper who can also tap on to the data downloaded during repair is desired. Security in distributed storage systems with heterogeneous storage nodes is considered in [67] .
Han et al. [73] deal with Byzantine fault tolerance by employing product-matrix codes [12] . They use a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) to check the integrity of data during repair and reconstruction, and a feedback scheme to iteratively correct them. However, CRC based schemes are not applicable in the present setting of information-theoretic security since the CRC may also be corrupted by the adversary. The present paper takes a more fundamental look at the problem of handling corruptions in regenerating codes from an informationtheoretic perspective.
Oggier and Datta [74] derive bounds to determine the secure storage capacity in a 'cooperative-repair' setting [75] . The bounds of [74] show that such an attempt to cooperatively repair may adversely affect the system in the presence of malicious adversaries. Dikaliotis et al. [76] study the security of distributed storage systems in the presence of a trusted verifier. Kosut [77] propose using polytope codes to address the issue of security against active adversaries.
Another problem setting that falls in the broader domain of information-theoretic security for distributed storage is that of Private Information Retrieval (PIR) [78] . While traditional PIR schemes were designed for replicated data, the work [79] introduced PIR for erasure-coded data.
B. Shamir's Secret Sharing
A possible method to ensure information-theoretic security from passive eavesdroppers is to employ Shamir's secret sharing scheme [80] . Under Shamir's secret sharing scheme, the data is encoded and stored in a set of n nodes such that the entire data can be recovered from any k nodes, while access to data in any (k − 1) or fewer nodes provides zero information about the data. Now, during repair of a failed node, this scheme requires a download of the entire data to a central location, following which the data in the replacement node is re-encoded. Thus, as in the case of classical erasure codes, the repair operations are inefficient, mandating significant network resources. Furthermore, this central location represents a single point of failure, and security in such a system can be compromised by an eavesdropper who gains access to this location. These critical issues thus necessitate investigation of alternative solutions that account for the routinely performed failure-handling tasks.
C. Secure Network Coding
The literature on secure network coding (e.g., [37] , [41] , [43] , [44] ) primarily considers a multicast setting in which there is a single source of data and every destination is interested is obtaining all the data transmitted by the source. Furthermore, with respect to security from passive eavesdroppers in the multicast setting, only the scenarios where the eavesdropper can access subsets of links is well understood in the literature. The problem of secure distributed storage considered in this paper requires handling the case when nodes are compromised. The problem of node-compromise is typically treated as a case of link-compromise by assuming that the eavesdropper gains access to all links that are incident upon the compromised nodes. In our problem, since a node may be repaired by connecting to any d nodes, schemes following such an approach cannot have a non-zero rate of transmission in general.
Even in the case of active adversaries, the problem of handling compromised nodes is much harder [42] than handling compromised links. Furthermore, our problem falls into the harder setting of non-multicast, whereas the literature on secure network coding primarily considers the multicast setting. The works [39] , [40] present results showing guarantees of error correction under random linear network coding under the condition that the subspace obtained at the receiver has a sufficient intersection with the transmitted subspace, a condition that is not guaranteed in our setting. Jaggi et al. [38] propose schemes to transmit a message equal to the difference between the largest message that can be sent in the absence of secrecy requirements and a bound on the number of compromised links. In our problem, this difference is almost always 0 or smaller since a compromised node may assist in any number of repairs of any other node. The results of the present paper, on the other hand, establish the capacity of a class of non-multicast networks in the presence of active adversaries or passive eavesdroppers having the ability to compromise nodes. Interestingly, these capacity-achieving codes proposed in this paper are linear, deterministic and explicit.
The problem of providing information-theoretic secrecy in distributed storage systems is also related to the Wiretap Channel II [81] where an eavesdropper, who is listening to any arbitrary subset of symbols (of fixed size) being transmitted over a noiseless point-to-point channel, should obtain no information about the original message. While schemes providing secrecy in a distributed storage system with only the reconstruction requirement would follow directly from [81] , the requirement of addressing node-repair makes the problem non-trivial.
IV. THE PRODUCT-MATRIX FRAMEWORK
The secure codes presented in this paper are based on the product-matrix codes [12] , and this section describes their underlying framework. These codes operate at both extremities of the storage-bandwidth tradeoff for the parameters: 1) MBR: all parameters [n, k, d], and 2) MSR: all parameters [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2]. Observe from (5), (4), (7) and (8) that for each of these cases, the values of B and α are multiples of β. It follows that given an optimal code for β = 1, optimal codes for any higher value of β (say, β 0 ) can be obtained by simply concatenating the β = 1 code β 0 number of times. This process is known as striping. Thus in this paper, without loss of generality, we consider only the case of β = 1.
Product-matrix codes are represented in terms of an (n × α) code matrix
where • the 'code matrix' C is an (n × α) matrix with its i th row comprising the α symbols stored in node i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), • the 'message matrix' M is a (d × α) matrix, whose elements comprise all the message symbols, along with some random symbols, arranged in a specific (and possibly redundant) manner, and • the 'encoding matrix' is a fixed (n × d) matrix.
Denoting the i th row of by ψ T i , the α symbols stored in node i are
The d length vector ψ T i is termed as the encoding vector of node i . Thus each node stores the inner product of its encoding vector with the message matrix. The specific structures of the matrices M and vary with the choice of the operating regime (MBR or MSR) and the level of security required, and their design is described in the subsequent sections. Fig. 4 depicts an example of a code constructed under the productmatrix framework.
A. Systematic Codes
A systematic code is one wherein some set of k nodes together store all the B message symbols in an uncoded form. This set of k nodes are called systematic nodes. In several applications of interest, it may be desired to have the code in a systematic form, since decoding of the data is not required whenever the data-collector connects to the k systematic nodes.
The codes for security from active adversaries that presented in this paper can be constructed in both systematic or nonsystematic forms. On the other hand, a code operating under the requirement of information-theoretic security from passive eavesdroppers cannot be systematic. This is because, if any part of the message is stored in an uncoded form in any node, an eavesdropper tapping onto that node would obtain a nonzero amount of information about the message.
The following sections employ the product-matrix framework to construct secure MBR and MSR codes.
V. MBR CODES FOR SECURITY FROM
ACTIVE ADVERSARIES MBR codes download the minimum possible amount of data during repair: a replacement node downloads only what it stores, resulting in dβ = α. Recall from Section II-A (see (5) and (4)) that in the absence of security requirements, an MBR code must satisfy
In this section we present explicit constructions of optimal MBR codes for all parameter values [n, k, d], providing security from active adversaries. As discussed in Section II-C, our code constructions, in addition to being optimal, provide on-demand security. These codes are optimal in the sense that they achieve (15) with equality for every value of the desired security level p.
A. Encoding Algorithm
The encoding procedure of the codes for security from active adversaries is identical to that of the product-matrix codes without security requirements [12] , and is independent of the desired levels of security. This procedure is briefly described below for the sake of completeness.
We apply the striping procedure described in Section IV, and construct codes for β = 1. Identical encoding, repair and reconstruction operations are performed independently on each stripe of β = 1. Setting β = 1 in (17) gives
Recall from Section IV that the product-matrix codes are represented in terms of an (n × α) code matrix
where the i th row of C contains the α symbols stored in node i (1 ≤ i ≤ n). Thus the i th node stores ψ T i M where ψ T i is the i th row , and is termed the encoding vector of node i .
The encoding matrix for the MBR code is of the form
where is an (n × k) matrix, and is an ( n × (d − k) ) matrix. The matrices and are chosen such that: (i) any k rows of are linearly independent, and (ii) any d rows of are linearly independent. These requirements can be met, for example, by choosing to be either a Cauchy or a Vandermonde matrix [82] . Observe that these properties make the generator matrix of an [n, k] MDS code, and the generator matrix of an [n, d] MDS code. The choice of the finite field F q is restricted (only) by the matrix : choosing as a Vandermonde matrix permits any q ≥ n. The message matrix M contains the B message symbols arranged in a specific form. As mentioned previously, in our approach, the encoding mechanism is independent of the number of compromised nodes in the system. Hence the number of message symbols is equal to that in the regenerating codes setting with no security requirements (18):
The (d × d) message matrix is designed to be of the form
where S is a (k ×k) symmetric matrix, and V is a (k × (d −k)) matrix. The B message symbols populate the k(k+1) 2 distinct entries of S and the k(d − k) entries of V . Observe that this specific structure makes the message matrix M symmetric.
In the MBR toy example provided in Fig. 4 , with [n = 5, k = 2, d = 2] and (β = 1, α = 2, B = 3), the (5 × 2) encoding matrix and the (2 × 2) message matrix M take the values:
with a, b, and c as the three message symbols.
Remark 5 (Systematic Code):
The PM-MBR code can be made systematic by choosing the encoding matrix as
where I k is the (k × k) identity matrix, 0 is a (k × (d − k)) zero matrix,˜ and are matrices of sizes ((n − k) × k) and ((n − k) × (d − k) ) respectively, such that ˜ is a Cauchy matrix (or any matrix such that all of its submatrices are of full rank). The example in Fig. 4 depicts a systematic product-matrix MBR code. This completes the description of the encoding procedure. We now present the decoding algorithms that ensure security from active eavesdroppers.
B. Algorithm for Secure Node Repair
The following theorem presents an explicit algorithm for node-repair in the presence of compromised nodes.
Theorem 6 (Secure Node-Repair): In the code presented, for any value of parameter p, the repair of a failed node can be secured from the compromise of up to p nodes, by letting the replacement node download β = 1 symbols each from (d + 2 p) arbitrary nodes. The amount of data downloaded in this processes is minimum, thus establishing the secure storage capacity of such systems. The choice of parameter p is arbitrary, and can be different for every instance of repair, thus providing on-demand security.
Proof: Suppose during any instance of node-repair, it is desired to provide security from the compromise of up to p nodes, for some choice of p. Let f denote the failed node and ψ f be its encoding vector. The α(= d) symbols stored in the failed node are ψ T f M. The replacement node then connects to some arbitrary (d +2 p) nodes. The replacement node is required to recover these d symbols by downloading β = 1 symbol each from the (d + 2 p) nodes that it connects to, when at most p of these nodes are compromised. Let J denote the set of these (d +2 p) nodes. Under our repair algorithm, each of these (d + 2 p) nodes pass the inner-product of the α values stored in them with the encoding vector of the failed node f . That is, for every j ∈ J , node j passes the value of ψ T j Mψ f . This value may be corrupt if node j is compromised by the adversary. Let J denote the ((d + 2 p) × d) submatrix of , with its (d +2 p) rows comprising the vectors {ψ T j } j ∈J . Under this notation, one can see that the replacement node has access to the (d + 2 p) encoded symbols J Mψ f , of which at most p symbols may be in error. This set of symbols can equivalently be viewed as an encoding of Mψ f by the generator matrix J . To complete the decoding process, we now call upon the MDS property of matrix . By construction, is the generator matrix of an [n, d] MDS code. Hence its submatrix J is the generator matrix of a [d + 2 p, d] MDS code. This implies that the code with J as its generator matrix has a minimum distance of (2 p+1). Thus, when at most p of the (d + 2 p) symbols J Mψ f are corrupt, the replacement node can apply standard decoding algorithms for MDS codes and recover Mψ f correctly. Finally, since the message matrix M is symmetric, the d elements comprising Mψ f can be written as
are precisely the d values that were stored in the failed node.
The repair algorithm described above requires the replacement node to connect to some arbitrary = (d + 2 p) nodes, and download β = 1 symbol from each. The amount of storage and data download during repair satisfies (21) and meets the outer bound (15) with equality, thus establishing optimality.
Example 7: Fig. 3 depicts an example of this algorithm where repair of the first node is performed, while providing protection from up to p = 1 compromised nodes. The encoding process of the code is illustrated in Fig. 4 . For the repair of node 1 as shown in the figure, the replacement node connects to = d + 2 p = 4 other nodes and each of these nodes pass an inner-product of their data with ψ 1 = [1 0], i.e., pass their first symbol. The data {b, a +b, a +2b, a +3b} is an MDS encoding of {a, b} allowing for the correction of up to one arbitrary error.
C. Algorithm for Secure Data Reconstruction
The following theorem presents an explicit algorithm for data reconstruction in the presence of compromised nodes.
Theorem 8 (Secure Data-Reconstruction): In the code presented, a data-collector can recover all the B message symbols by downloading data stored in (k + 2 p) arbitrary nodes, in the presence of up to p compromised nodes. The choice of parameter p is arbitrary, and can be different for every instance of data-reconstruction, thus providing on-demand security.
Proof: Suppose during any instance of datareconstruction, it is desired to provide protection from the compromise of up to p nodes, for some choice of p. The data-collector then connects to (k + 2 p) arbitrary nodes. Let I denote the set of (k + 2 p) nodes to which the data-collector connects. Then, from every node i ∈ I, the data collector downloads the α symbols
From the structure of the (see (20)) we have
where I is a ((k + 2 p) × k) matrix and I is a ((k + 2 p) × (d − k)) matrix. The (k + 2 p) rows of I and I respectively are comprised of (k + 2 p) of the rows of and (indexed by I). From the specific structure (22) of the message matrix M, we see that the data-collector equivalently has access to the encoded symbols
Note that the (k + 2 p) rows of the matrix I M are obtained from (k + 2 p) different nodes. Thus, a compromise of up to p of the nodes to an active adversary leads to at most p of the rows of I M being corrupt.
We now call upon the MDS property of to complete the reconstruction process. Recall that by construction, is the generator matrix of an [n, k] MDS code. Hence its submatrix I is the generator matrix of an [k + 2 p, k] MDS code. It follows that a code with I as its generator matrix has a minimum distance of (2 p + 1), and thus has the ability to correct up to p arbitrary errors. Consider the set of symbols I V that the data collector has obtained. Observe that any column of the matrix I V is an encoding of the corresponding column of V with I as the generator matrix. Thus, when at most p of the nodes are compromised, the data-collector can correctly decode each column of I V separately using standard algorithms for decoding MDS codes. At the end of this process, the data-collector recovers the matrix V correctly. The next step is to decode S from the downloaded data. Since the value of V is (correctly) known, the data-collector can subtract I V T from ( I S + I V T ) to recover I S.
Again, the matrix I S is an encoding of the columns of S by the generator matrix I , which allows for the decoding of S in a manner identical to the decoding of V even in the presence of upto p corrupt rows.
VI. MBR CODES FOR SECURITY FROM PASSIVE EAVESDROPPERS
In this section, we present explicit constructions of MBR codes secure from passive eavesdroppers that support all values of [n, k, d] and all {, m}. As discussed previously, unlike the proposed codes for security from active adversaries, the codes for security from passive eavesdroppers do not provide on-demand security. As a result, the desired level {, m} of security must be chosen apriori at the time of encoding. The MBR regime is governed by the relation α = dβ, and substituting this in (9) gives an upper bound on the amount of data B * that can be stored in a {, m}-secure MBR code as
The codes presented here achieve this bound with equality When any parameter takes different values in the secure and non-secure versions, we will denote the parameter associated to a code providing security with a superscript asterisk ( * ) as done in (25) and (26) .
A. Encoding
We will now construct an {, m}-secure MBR code satisfying (26) . We apply the striping procedure described in Section IV, and (without loss of generality) construct codes for the case β = 1. Setting β = 1 in (26) gives
The product-matrix codes for security from eavesdroppers possess a structure identical to those without security requirements. The difference between the two codes is that in the absence of security requirements, the elements of the message matrix M consist of the message symbols, whereas in the situation when security is needed, a specific set of elements of the message matrix are replaced by random symbols. Thus, to construct an {, m}-secure code for any [n, k, d], first consider an [n, k, d] product-matrix MSR code in the absence of security requirements, as constructed in Section V-A. Denote the this code by C, and further, let C * denote the {, m}-secure code (which we will construct below). The code C is described by an (n × α) code matrix C = M as defined in (19) , with the (d × d) matrix M comprising B = kd − k(k−1) 2 message values (18) . Following the productmatrix framework, the code C * is also described by an (n × α) code matrix C * of the form C * = * M * . The matrices Fig. 5. Structure of the (d × d) message matrix M * for the {, m}-secure MBR code. The matrix is symmetric and comprises of blocks of data, random symbols, and zeros. The code is given by C * = * M * where * is the encoding matrix. * and M * for code C * are obtained by modifying the matrices and M of code C in a manner described below.
The (n × d) encoding matrix * is required to satisfy the following property in addition to those required by : when restricted to the first columns, any rows are linearly independent. The choice of * as a Cauchy or a Vandermonde matrix satisfies this property as well.
The
message symbols in the first rows (and hence first columns) of the symmetric matrix M by R random symbols. Each random symbol is drawn independently and uniformly from F q . The structure of the resulting message matrix is illustrated in Fig. 5 . Finally, node i (1 ≤ i ≤ n) stores the i th row of the (n × α) code matrix C * = * M * .
The following example illustrates the encoding procedure. Example 9: Consider the code depicted in Fig. 2 providing security from passive eavesdroppers. This code operates in the MBR regime with parameters n = 3, k = 2 and d = 2, and provides security against eavesdroppers who may gain access to ( = 1, m = 1) nodes. Let the alphabet of operation be F 3 and let α = 2 and β = 1. From (26) we get that the maximum size of the message that can be stored securely in this system is B * = 1 symbol (we could have stored B = 3 symbols in the absence of security requirements). Let us denote this solitary message symbol as a. Following (27), we draw R = 2 symbols r 1 and r 2 uniformly at random from F 3 . The encoding vector of any node
Each node i stores ψ T i M * as shown in Fig. 2 .
B. Reconstruction, Repair and Security
The following theorems prove the properties of reconstruction, repair and security.
Theorem 10 (Data-Reconstruction and Node-Repair): In code C * , a data-collector can recover all the B * message symbols by downloading the data stored in any k nodes, and a failed node can be repaired by downloading β = 1 symbol each from any d remaining nodes.
Proof: Treating the random symbols also as message symbols, code C * becomes identical to C. Thus reconstruction and repair in C * are identical to that in C.
Note that repair and reconstruction can be carried out ensuring security from corruption by active adversaries by employing the explicit algorithms of Section V-B and Section V-C.
Theorem 11 (Information-Theoretic Security): The code C * ensures {, m}-security, i.e., an eavesdropper having access to the data stored in up to nodes, and to all the data passed to up to m of these nodes during one or more of their repair operations, gets no information about the message.
Proof: The complete proof is provided in the appendix, and we provide an outline here. Let U, R and E respectively denote random variables corresponding to the message, the random symbols inserted at the encoding stage, and the data available to the eavesdropper respectively. The proof proceeds in three steps: first it is shown that H (R|E, U) = 0. The second step is to prove H (E) ≤ R. The final step shows that these two conditions suffice to guarantee complete security, i.e., I (U; E) = 0.
VII. MSR CODES FOR SECURITY FROM
ACTIVE ADVERSARIES MSR codes use the minimum possible storage at each node. Recall from Section II-A (see (7) and (8)) that in the absence of security requirements, an MSR code must satisfy
In this section we present explicit constructions of optimal MSR codes for all parameter values [n, k, d ≥ 2k−2] providing on-demand security from active adversaries. We employ the striping procedure described in Section IV, and without loss of generality construct optimal codes for β = 1. Since the proposed codes are required to provide on-demand security, the encoding procedure is independent of the level of security desired and is identical to the case when no security is required.
We first construct the code for the case d = 2k − 2 and then use the shortening technique of [11] and [12] to obtain codes for all d ≥ 2k − 2. As we will see subsequently, the decoding algorithms and the security properties of the code for d > 2k − 2 follow directly from the corresponding properties of the d = 2k − 2 code.
A. Encoding Algorithm for d = 2k − 2
In the MSR regime with d = 2k − 2 and β = 1, from (28) we have The product-matrix MSR code is described by an (n × α) code matrix C of the form C = M, with an (n ×d) encoding matrix and an (d × α) message matrix M. The MSR code differs from the product-matrix MBR code in the specific design of the matrices and M.
Under the MSR regime, the (n × d) encoding matrix is of the form
where is an (n × α) matrix and is an (n × n) diagonal matrix. The matrices and are chosen such that: (i) any α rows of are linearly independent, (ii) any d rows of are linearly independent, and (iii) the diagonal elements of are all distinct. These requirements can be met, for example, by choosing to be a Vandermonde matrix with elements chosen carefully to satisfy the third condition: the i th
Observe that these properties make the generator matrix of an [n, α] MDS code, and the generator matrix of an [n, d] MDS code.
The choice of the matrix poses the only restriction to the choice of the finite field F q . For instance, choosing as a Vandermonde matrix (in the manner described above) permits any q ≥ n 2 .
We will now specify the design of the message matrix M. From (29b) and (29c), we have d = 2α and B = α(α + 1) respectively. The (d × α) message matrix M is constructed as
where S 1 and S 2 are (α ×α) symmetric matrices. The matrices S 1 and S 2 together have precisely α(α + 1) distinct entries, which are now populated by the B = α(α + 1) message symbols. Thus, under this encoding mechanism, node i (1 ≤ i ≤ n), stores the α symbols
This encoding procedure is illustrated below with an example. This example will subsequently be reused to illustrate secure node-repair. 
The code is given by C = M. The resultant code is depicted in Fig. 6 .
Remark 13 (Systematic Code): Although the encoding mechanism described above does not directly result in a systematic code, it can be converted easily to systematic form by following a procedure that will be described subsequently in Section VII-D.
This completes the description of the encoding procedure. We now move on to present decoding algorithms for noderepair and data-reconstruction with on-demand security.
B. Algorithm for Secure Node Repair
The following theorem presents an explicit algorithm for node-repair that ensures security in the presence of compromise of nodes to an active adversary.
Theorem 14 (Secure Node-Repair): In the code presented, for any desired value of p, the repair of a failed node can be secured from the compromise of up to p nodes, by letting the replacement node download β = 1 values each from (d + 2 p) arbitrary nodes. The amount of data downloaded in this processes is minimum, thus establishing the secure storage capacity of such systems. The choice of parameter p is arbitrary, and can be different for every instance of repair, thus providing on-demand security.
Proof: Suppose during any instance of node-repair, it is desired to provide protection from the compromise of up to p nodes, for some choice of p. Let f denote the failed node and ψ f = [φ f λ f φ f ] be its encoding vector. The α(= d 2 ) symbols stored in the failed node are
The replacement node connects to some (d + 2 p) nodes. The replacement node is required to recover these α symbols by downloading β = 1 symbol each from the (d+2p) nodes that it connects to, when at most p of these nodes are compromised. Let J denote the set of these (d +2p) nodes. Under our repair algorithm, each of these (d + 2p) nodes pass the inner-product of the α values stored in them with the encoding vector ψ f of the failed node f . That is, for every j ∈ J , node j passes the value of ψ T j Mφ f . This value may be corrupt if node j is compromised by the adversary.
Let J denote the ((d + 2 p) × d) submatrix of , with the rows of J comprising the (d +2 p) rows of that correspond to the (d + 2 p) nodes in J . Then the replacement node has access to the (d + 2 p) values J Mφ f .
To simplify notation, let us define a quantity μ as
In terms of this notation, the (d + 2 p) encoded symbols downloaded by the replacement node can be written as J μ.
To decode in the presence of possible corruption, we will exploit the MDS property of the matrix . By construction, is the generator matrix of an [n, d] MDS code. Hence, J is the generator matrix of a [d + 2 p, d] MDS code. This implies that J has a minimum distance of (2 p + 1). The (d + 2 p) symbols J μ downloaded by the replacement node are simply an encoding of μ under a code that has J as its generator matrix. Hence, the replacement node can recover μ correctly by decoding the MDS code J in the presence of up to p corruptions. Thus, even in the presence of up to p compromised nodes in the system, the replacement node correctly recovers
Thus the replacement node has access to the correct values of S 1 φ f and S 2 φ f . The symmetry of S 1 and S 2 allows for the computation of φ T f S 1 + λ f φ T f S 2 correctly, and this is precisely the collection of α symbols that were stored in the failed node.
The following example illustrates this repair algorithm.
Example 15: Consider the code described in Example 12 (Fig. 6 ) for parameters [n = 7, k = 3, d = 4]. Suppose node 2 fails and needs to be repaired with a security from the compromise of any p = 1 other node. From the construction described in Example 12, we see that φ T f = [1 1]. Under the secure repair algorithm described above, the replacement node connects to the = d + 2 p = 6 remaining nodes. Each of these nodes takes an inner product of its data with the vector [1 1] , i.e., passes the sum of the two symbols it stores. The data thereby obtained by the replacement node is a [6, 4] -MDS code with the message as {a + b, b + c, d + e, e + f }; the six symbols obtained by the replacement node are: 
C. Algorithm for Secure Data Reconstruction
The following theorem presents an explicit algorithm for data-reconstruction that ensures security in the presence of nodes compromised by an active adversary.
Theorem 16 (Secure Data-Reconstruction): In the code presented, a data-collector can recover all the B message symbols by downloading data stored in (k + 2 p) arbitrary nodes, in the presence of up to p compromised nodes. The choice of parameter p is arbitrary, and can be different for every instance of data-reconstruction, thus providing on-demand security.
Proof: Consider a data-reconstruction operation that requires security from up to p compromised nodes. Then, under our protocol for data-reconstruction, a data-collector connects to (k + 2 p) arbitrary nodes in the system and downloads the α symbols stored in each of these nodes. Let I denote this set of (k + 2 p) nodes. Of these, let A denote the subset of nodes compromised by the adversary. To prove the correctness of our reconstruction algorithm for the desired protection-level p, we assume that the size of A is no larger than p. Of course, the set A is not known to the decoding algorithm, and is used here only to illustrate the algorithm.
Let I denote the ((k + 2 p) × d) submatrix of , whose rows comprise the set I of the rows of . From the structure of the encoding matrix (30), we can write I as Fig. 7 . An illustration of the error patterns arising during the reconstruction process under the product-matrix MSR code providing security from active adversaries. The pattern shown in part (a) depicts the corruption of some p rows (corresponding to the set A) of the received data. The remaining parts (b)-(f) illustrate the resulting error patterns at various steps of the decoding algorithm. Note that the p corrupt rows are shown as contiguous only for ease of illustration.
Then the data collector has access to the encoded symbols
of which the p rows corresponding to A can be corrupt. An example of such an error pattern is illustrated in Fig. 7a . The data-collector multiplies this term by T I to obtain I Mφ T
Note that since this operation involves only column operations, the error patterns do not change, and only the p rows corresponding to A continue to be corrupt. Next, define two ((α + 1) × (α + 1)) matrices P and Q as
Since S 1 and S 2 are symmetric, it follows that the matrices P and Q are also symmetric. One can rewrite the data available to the data-collector in terms of P and Q as
of which the p rows corresponding to A can be corrupt (Fig. 7b ). Now, for any i and j such that 1 ≤ i, j ≤ k+2 p and i = j , the (i, j ) th , element of the matrix P + I Q is
and its ( j, i ) th element is
where (41) follows from the symmetry of matrices P and Q. By construction, λ i = λ j whenever i = j , and hence using (40) and (41), the data-collector solves for the values of P i j and Q i j for all i = j (in other words, the data-collector solves for all non-diagonal elements of P and Q). However, some of these computed values may be in error due to the corruption of p of the rows in P + I Q. In particular, the p rows (and hence the p columns) corresponding to A may be in error in P as well as in Q. These error patterns in P and Q are illustrated in Fig. 7c . We will now use the (possibly corrupt) values of the nondiagonal elements of matrices P and Q to correctly decode S 1 and S 2 respectively. Let us first consider recovery of S 1 , for which we will use the values of the non-diagonal elements of P obtained above. Consider any column j (1 ≤ j ≤ k + 2 p) of the matrix P, and let J = I\{ j }. The j th column of the matrix P, excluding the element on its diagonal, is J S 1 φ j , and is of length (k + 2 p − 1) = (α + 2 p). Recall that by construction, is the generator matrix of an [n, α] MDS code. Hence its submatrix J is the generator matrix of an [α + 2 p, α] MDS code. It follows that J has a minimum distance of (2 p + 1). The symbols J S 1 φ j can be considered as an encoding of the vector S 1 φ j using the generator matrix J . Using the MDS property of J , the algorithm attempts to decode S 1 φ j , assuming the presence of no more than p errors. Recall from the discussion above that the vector S 1 φ j has at most p corrupt entries if j / ∈ A, but it can be entirely corrupt if j ∈ A (see Fig. 7d ). As a result, the datacollector obtains the correct value of S 1 J if j / ∈ A, and a possibly corrupt value if j ∈ A as shown in Fig. 7e (of course, the data-collector still does not know A and hence does not know if the value obtained is correct or not). However, when the size of A is at most p, at most p of these decoded vectors
may be in error. Now, these vectors comprise the columns of the matrix S 1 T I as seen in Fig. 7e . Again, since I is the generator matrix of an [α + 2 p + 1, α] MDS code, one can decode the (α × α) matrix S 1 from S 1 T I in the presence of up to p erroneous columns. Thus, the datacollector correctly recovers S 1 .
Following steps identical to recovery of S 1 from P, the datacollector also correctly decodes matrix S 2 from the nondiagonal elements of Q. In this manner, the data collector correctly recovers all the message symbols in the presence of at most p compromised nodes.
D. Conversion to Systematic Form
Any MSR code where failed nodes are replaced by their exact replicas can be converted to systematic form through a remapping of the source symbols. An explicit algorithm to convert the product-matrix MSR codes was provided in [12] , and is briefly reproduced here for subsequent use. Let k denote the (k × d) submatrix of matrix with its k rows comprising the first k rows of . Let U be a (k × α) matrix consisting of the B (= kα) message symbols as its kα entries. Now, choose the message matrix M to satisfy
while maintaining the structure of M as given by (31) . The value of M in (42) can be obtained by using the decoding algorithm for data reconstruction (for p = 0). With this M as the message matrix, under the encoding algorithm of Section VII-A, the first k nodes will store the data k M. This is precisely the matrix of uncoded message symbols U , thus making these nodes systematic. Note that following this remapping, the node repair algorithm remains the same. Data reconstruction from the k systematic nodes requires no computation, while decoding from parity nodes requires the additional step of recovering U from M by pre-multiplication with k as in (42) .
Example 17: Fig. 8 depicts an example of a systematic product-matrix MSR code providing (on-demand) security from malicious adversaries. This code is obtained by converting the code of Example 12 (Fig. 6 ) into a systematic form by remapping the source symbols.
E. Shortening for d ≥ 2k − 2
A shortening technique under the MSR regime for constructing low-redundancy codes from the high-redundancy codes was introduced in [11] and [14] . This technique is employed in [12] to extend the d = 2k − 2 product-matrix MSR code to the parameter range of d ≥ 2k − 2. In this section we construct secure MSR codes for d ≥ 2k − 2 that meet (28) by applying this shortening technique to the secure MSR codes of Section VII-A.
Since the codes are required to provide on-demand security, the shortening procedure to obtain secure codes for d ≥ 2k − 2 is independent of the desired security levels, and is identical to the corresponding procedure in the absence of security [12, Sec. V-C]. We briefly describe this procedure and show that these codes provide optimal security from active adversaries.
Suppose for some positive integer i , one wishes to construct a product-matrix MSR code with parameters [n, k, d = 2k − 2 + i ]. Moreover, it is desired to construct an optimal code, i.e., a code whose parameters (B, α, β) satisfy (28) . As the first step in this task, we construct a product-matrix MSR code for the parameters [n = n + i , k = k + i , d = d + i = 2k − 2 + 2i ]. Note that this parameter set satisfies d = 2k − 2, and one can employ the encoding procedure described in Section VII-A for this construction. Next, this code is converted to a systematic form as described in Section VII-D. Let us denote the resultant systematic code by C . In order to obtain the desired [n, k, d = 2k − 2 + i ] code C, we observe from (28) that the number of message symbols B in code C is (k + i )(k − 1 + i ), and the number of message symbols B in code C is k(k − 1 + i ). Taking a cue from this expression, to obtain code C from code C , we set the i (k − 1 + i ) message symbols stored in the first i (systematic) nodes in code C to zero. The data stored in the remaining n nodes, which is an encoding of the remaining 6, k = 2, d = 3) . The message is {a, b, c, d} and the finite field of operation is F 13 . In the absence of security requirements ( p = 0), repair of any node f (1 ≤ f ≤ 6) is performed by connecting to any d = 3 nodes and downloading the inner product of the two symbols in each node with [1 x f ] , where x f is the f th element of x = [0 1 2 6 5 4] . The repair of any node f (1 ≤ f ≤ 6), with security from compromise of any p = 1 node, is performed by connecting to any (d + 2 p) = 5 nodes and downloading the inner product of the two symbols in each node with [1 x f ]. The code is optimal: it requires the minimum possible storage (it is MDS), and for this storage, it requires the minimum possible amount of download in each of the aforementioned scenarios.
Example 18: Fig. 9 depicts an example of a product-matrix MSR code providing (on-demand) security from malicious adversaries for a parameter set satisfying d > 2k − 2. This code is obtained by shortening the code of Example 17 ( Fig. 9 .
The following theorem provides explicit algorithms for secure reconstruction and repair algorithms for this code.
Theorem 19 (Secure Data-Reconstruction and Node-Repair): In the code presented, a data-collector can recover all the B message symbols by downloading data stored in (k + 2 p) arbitrary nodes, and a replacement node can recover all the data stored in the failed node by downloading β = 1 symbols each from (d + 2 p) arbitrary nodes, in the presence of up to p compromised nodes. The choice of parameter p is arbitrary, and can be different for every instance of datareconstruction and node-repair, thus providing on-demand security.
Proof: To see how reconstruction and repair are performed in code C, we can pretend to operate under code C , and assume that a user (or replacement node) always connects to the first i nodes in addition to the k (or d) nodes that it chooses in C. The data in the first i nodes is known to be all zero, and hence cannot be erroneous. Thus, reconstruction or repair in C with a security level of p is identical to that in C with the same security level p. It follows that the reconstruction and repair operations in code C are identical to those in C .
Optimality is a result of the parameters of C satisfying the bound (28) .
VIII. MSR CODES FOR SECURITY FROM PASSIVE EAVESDROPPERS
Recall from (28) that in the absence of secrecy requirements, the MSR regime has
Unlike the MSR codes for security from active adversaries, the codes for security from passive eavesdroppers do not provide on-demand security. Thus, one needs to fix the desired level of security {, m} at the time of encoding. In this section we present explicit constructions of MSR codes for all parameter values [n, k, d ≥ 2k − 2] and all {, m} providing information-theoretic security from passive eavesdroppers. The {, m}-secure MSR codes constructed in this paper achieve
Note that (44) meets the lower bound (11) for m ≤ 1 making the proposed codes optimal for this regime and also establishing the secure storage capacity of this parameter regime.
For a specified set of parameters [n, k, d], let R denote the difference in the number of message symbols B that can be stored in a system without security, and the number B * that can be stored in the {, m}-secure system constructed here. From (28) and (44), the value of R is given by
We now describe the construction of the secure productmatrix MSR code, which is performed by replacing precisely R message symbols in the code of VII-A by R random symbols. As done in Section VII, we will first consider the case of d = 2k − 2, and subsequently extend it to d ≥ 2k − 2 via a shortening procedure. Observe from (43) and (44) that the parameters B * and α are multiples of β. This allows us to perform striping (explained in Section IV) and construct codes for β = 1 without loss of generality.
A. Encoding for d = 2k − 2 An {, m}-secure product-matrix MSR code for the parameters [n, k, d] is obtained by modifying the [n, k, d] productmatrix MSR code constructed in Section VII-A. Let us denote the product-matrix MSR code of Section VII-A by C, and the code with security (which will be constructed below) by C * .
The code C * also belongs to the product-matrix framework, and is described by an (n × α) code matrix C * = * M * . The matrices * and M * are obtained by modifying the matrices and M of Section VII-A as follows. Choose * such that it satisfies the following property in addition to those required for : when restricted to the first columns, any rows of * are linearly independent. The choice of * as a Vandermode matrix as described in Section VII-A satisfies this additional property.
When β = 1, the value of R in (45) symbols in the intersection of the first ( − 1) rows and first ( − 1) columns of the symmetric matrix S 2 , and the (k − )m remaining symbols in the first m rows (and hence the first m columns) of S 2 . Fig. 10 depicts this procedure.
The following example illustrates this encoding procedure. Example 20: In this example, we will construct an MSR code for [n = 6, k = 3, d = 4]. Let the alphabet of operation be F 13 . With β = 1, (28) leads to having α = 2 and B = 6 in the absence of security requirements. Let us suppose we wish to provide security from an eavesdropper who can read the data stored in any one arbitrary node but not read any data downloaded during repair operations. This corresponds to parameters = 1 and m = 0. The maximum size of the message that can be stored (44) is B * = 4. We thus choose B − B * = 2 symbols r 1 and r 2 uniformly at random from 
The code is then given by C * = * M * . The data stored by the seven storage nodes under this code is depicted in Fig. 11 . One can verify that under this code, the data stored in any single node provides no information about the message.
B. Reconstruction, Repair and Security
The following theorems prove the properties of reconstruction, repair and security in the secure PM-MSR code.
Theorem 21 (Data-Reconstruction and Node-Repair): In the code presented, a data-collector can recover all the B * message symbols by downloading the data stored in any k nodes, and a failed node can be repaired by downloading β = 1 symbol each from any d remaining nodes.
Proof:
As in the proof of Theorem 10, treating the random symbols also as message symbols, the secure PM-MSR code C * becomes identical to the PM-MSR code C. Thus reconstruction and repair in C * are identical to that in C.
Theorem 22 (Information-Theoretic Security): The code C * ensures {, m}-security, i.e., an eavesdropper having access to the data stored in up to nodes, and to all the data passed to up to m of these nodes during one or more of their repair operations, gets no information about the message.
Proof: The proof follows the three-step procedure as in the proof in the MBR case (Theorem 11). Please see the Appendix for the complete proof.
C. Shortening for d ≥ 2k − 2
For any i ≥ 1, we will now construct product-matrix MSR codes having the parameters [n, k, d = 2k − 2 + i ], for any desired level {, m} of security. Let us denote this code (which we will construct below) as C * . The code C * will satisfy (44) , and is optimal when m ∈ {0, 1}. Throughout, we will assume without loss of generality that the data is striped, and consider β = 1 without loss of generality.
As the first step in this task, a secure product-matrix MSR code is constructed for the parameters
Note that this parameter set satisfies d = 2k − 2, and one can employ the encoding procedure described in Section VIII-A for this construction. Denote this code as C * .
Our goal is to derive the desired code C * by shortening the code C * . The shortening procedure described in Section VII-E provides one candidate approach towards this goal. Under this procedure, the code C * is derived from C * by setting the data in the first i nodes to zero, and treating all operations in the resultant code C * as operations in C * . However, this procedure requires the code to be made systematic, which is not possible under a code that provides security from passive eavesdroppers, since the compromise of any of the systematic nodes would directly reveal information about the message. Thus, in this section, we will follow a slightly different route to achieve that goal.
Let matrices * and M * respectively denote the (n × d ) encoding matrix and the (d × d ) message matrix of code C * . We will require the matrix * to satisfy an additional property that when restricted to the first i columns, any set of i rows are linearly independent. The choice of * as a Vandermonde matrix, as done in Section VII-A, satisfies this condition. Now, for the specific parameters of codes C * and C * , observe from (44) that
However, from (45) , we see that the number of random symbols R * in code C * is Fig. 11 . An MSR code for (n = 7, k = 3, d = 4) providing { = 1, m = 0} security from passive eavesdroppers: the data is secure from passive eavesdroppers who can read the data stored in any one arbitrary node but not to the data passed during repair of any node. The message is {a, b, c} and the finite field of operation is F 13 . The symbols r 1 and r 2 are drawn uniformly (and independently) at random from F 13 . The data of any node f (1 ≤ f ≤ 6), when required to protect from compromise of any p = 1 node, is obtained by connecting to any (d + 2 p) = 6 nodes and downloading the inner product of the two symbols in each node with [1 x f ] where x f is the f th element of x = [0 1 3 2 6 5 4]. The code is optimal in the sense that the amount of storage required is the minimum possible in this setting (it is MDS), and furthermore, the amount of download required for any repair is also the minimum possible under this amount of storage. and the number of random symbols R * in C * is
is the storage capacity per node in both codes C * and C * .
To obtain code C * from code C * , we replace a subset of i α random symbols from M * by a set of deterministically chosen symbols in the following manner. Let * i denote the (i × d) submatrix of * with its rows comprising the first i rows of * . Consider the following i α entries in M * : (a) the i α − i 2 symbols in the first i rows (and columns) of the symmetric matrix S * 1 , and (b) the i 2 symbols in the intersection of the first (i − 1) rows and the first (i − 1) columns of S * 2 . In the construction of code C * as per the procedure of Section VIII-A, each of these entries is populated by a randomly chosen value. With the goal of setting the data in first i nodes as zero, we instead choose these i α elements in a deterministic manner: once all other values of M * are fixed, we choose these values to satisfy *
This is feasible because, by construction, the first i columns of * i are linearly independent. Let M * denote the (d × d ) matrix resulting from this choice.
The encoding matrix * of code C * is chosen to be an (n × d ) matrix comprising the last n rows of * . Finally, the [n, k, d = 2k − 2 + i ] code C * with security {, m} is given by C * = * M * .
Theorem 23 (Data-Reconstruction and Node-Repair): In the code presented, a data-collector can recover all the message symbols by downloading the data stored in any k nodes, and a failed node can be repaired by downloading β = 1 symbol each from any d remaining nodes.
Proof: To see how reconstruction and repair are performed in code C * , we can pretend to operate under code C * , and assume that a user (or replacement node) always connects to the first i nodes in addition to the k (or d) nodes that it chooses in C * . This is a valid assumption since the data in the first i nodes of C * is known to be all zero. Thus, reconstruction or repair in C * is identical to that in C * , and is successful since C * is simply an
Theorem 24 (Information-Theoretic Security): In the code presented, an eavesdropper having access to the data stored in up to nodes, and to all the data passed to up to m of these nodes during one or more of their repair operations, gets no information about the message.
Proof: Please see the Appendix.
IX. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS TO SECURE ANY REGENERATING CODE FROM ACTIVE ADVERSARIES
The conversion of the product-matrix codes into codes providing on-demand security, as described in Section V and Section VII, raises a natural question as to whether any regenerating code can provide on-demand security. We answer this question by providing a necessary and sufficient condition for the same.
Theorem 25: An [n, k, d] regenerating code satisfying (2) can provide on-demand security from active adversaries and satisfy (13) with equality if and only if it has a repair mechanism that obeys the following condition: during any instance of repair, the data passed by an existing node to the replacement node does not depend on the identities of the other (d − 1) nodes helping in this repair process.
Proof: Necessity: Consider an [n, k, d] regenerating code, and assume for now that (n − d) is an odd number. Consider repair of a failed node f . Since the code provides on-demand security, it must be able to offer security from the compromise of p = n−d−1 2 nodes, by allowing the replacement node to download data from the remaining (d + 2 p) = (n − 1) nodes. First, observe that all the remaining (n − 1) nodes help in the repair, and this removes the dependence on the answer to "which other nodes help in the repair". Let σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 be the data downloaded from the (n − 1) remaining nodes. Since arbitrary errors in any p of these must be correctable, it follows that in the absence of any errors, any d-sized subset of {σ 1 , . . . , σ n−1 } must suffice for correct decoding. Now consider the operation of this code in the absence of security requirements. In this setting, consider the repair scheme wherein a node helping in the repair of a failed node passes precisely what it passed in the case with security. The arguments above ensure that the repair will be successful, and the data σ i passed is independent of the identities of the other (d − 1) nodes helping in this repair. If the parameters of the secure code satisfy (13) with equality, then those of the code without security will satisfy (2) .
Recall the error detection requirement of on-demand security discussed in Remark 4. When (n − d) is even, we invoke this requirement of detection of errors from the compromise of any p = n − d − 1 nodes, wherein the replacement node downloads data from the remaining (d + p) = (n − 1) nodes. The rest of the argument is identical to the case of (n − d) being odd considered above.
Sufficiency: Consider a regenerating code satisfying the property that in the absence of security requirements, for repair of any node f , the data passed by any helper node h is independent of the identities of the remaining (d − 1) helper nodes. For a desired security level p during repair of node f , let the replacement node connect to some (d + 2 p) arbitrary nodes. Let each of these (d +2 p) nodes pass the data it would have passed to the replacement node in the absence of security requirements. Since the data passed by any d of these nodes would suffice to recover the desired contents in the absence of errors, it follows that the aggregate data from the (d + 2 p) nodes can correct p arbitrary errors. As a result, this data allows for recovery of the desired data correctly even in the presence of up to p compromise nodes. An identical argument holds for the reconstruction property, thus ensuring that the code provides on-demand security. If the parameters of the original regenerating code satisfy (2) then those of the secure code will satisfy (13) with equality.
Corollary 26: A code satisfying conditions in Theorem 25 must necessarily operate in the parameter regime d < (n − 1).
Proof: Clearly, since the number of nodes contacted during repair must satisfy (d +2 p) ≤ (n −1), the requirement of supporting p > 0 requires that n > (d + 1). It follows that the code should not restrict the number of nodes n to be (d − 1).
X. DISCUSSION
The many recent incidents of the compromise of storage systems (e.g., [31] [32] [33] ) underscore the importance of securing the data in distributed storage systems. Such systems presently employ cryptographic techniques for providing security from passive eavesdroppers. Cryptographic techniques generally assume the eavesdropper to possess only a bounded computational power. However in practice, upon gaining access to the encrypted data, adversaries employ techniques such as intelligent guesswork, dictionary attacks or even crowd-sourcing, and often succeed in decoding significant parts of the data. Information-theoretic security, on the other hand, allows the adversary to posses unbounded computational power, but assumes that the adversary can gain access to only a limited amount of data. In the setting of distributed storage, the information-theoretic security relies on the assumption that the adversary cannot gain access to data stored in more than a certain number of nodes. However, informationtheoretic security typically necessitates much greater resourceoverheads; in our setting, these are overheads in storage and bandwidth.
The cryptographic and information-theoretic approaches for security rely on different kinds of assumptions, and the security in distributed storage systems may be enhanced by employing both approaches in tandem. To see this, consider a system in which the data is first encoded using conventional cryptographic techniques, following which, an informationtheoretically secure erasure code is employed for storing the data and handling node-failures. In such a setting, the adversary first needs to gain access to a certain minimum number of nodes (due to the information-theoretic security), without which it can neither obtain nor corrupt any data; even upon managing to gain such an access, the adversary obtains only the encrypted data. As a result, the layer of informationtheoretic security raises the barrier to gain access to the encrypted data. Furthermore, the security provided by the cryptographic encoding allows for the use of only a thin layer of information-theoretic security, wherein the threshold on the number of nodes (, m or p in our setting) can be as low as 2 or 3. This thus aids in overcoming the barrier of the significant overheads faced by information-theoretic security.
An analogy from an end user's perspective is that of storing data (securely) in cloud-based storage services. For instance, one may encode encrypted data using an informationtheoretically secure code, and store fractions of it in Dropbox, Google Drive and Microsoft Skydrive storage services. 3 Such a code will ensure that a compromise of one of these services provides zero information to the adversary. To get any information about the data, the adversary will need to hack into at least two of the three services.
In this paper, we addressed the information theoretic part. We presented explicit codes for distributed storage that offer protection from active adversaries and passive eavesdroppers. For a large range of parameters the codes achieve the outer bounds on the system requirements, thus also establishing the storage capacity of such systems.
APPENDIX
We now present proofs of security from passive eavesdroppers. We use H (·) to denote Shannon entropy and I (·; ·) to denote mutual information. All logarithms are taken to base q where q is the size of the finite field of operation of the code under consideration.
Proof of Theorem 11 ({, m} Security Under the MBR Code):
We consider the worst case where the eavesdropper indeed gains access to the data stored in some nodes and the data passed during any of the repair operations of some m of these nodes.
Consider the repair of some node f under the productmatrix MBR code, and consider any node i helping in the repair process. Let ψ * f and ψ * i denote the encoding vectors of nodes f and i respectively. The data passed by node i under the repair algorithm is (ψ * i ) T M * ψ * f . Since matrix M * is symmetric, this is equal to (ψ * f ) T M * ψ * i . Thus, an eavesdropper listening to the data downloaded for repair of node f obtains no more than (ψ * f ) T M * , which is the data stored in node f . Let * eve be the ( × d) submatrix of * , with its rows comprising the rows of corresponding to the nodes to which the eavesdropper has gained access. Thus the eavesdropper has access to the d symbols in the ( × d) matrix E * defined as
Let E denote the set of these d symbols that the eavesdropper has gained access to. Further, let U denote the set of all B * message symbols and let R denote the set of all R = B − B * random symbols introduced at the encoding stage. In the proof, with some abuse of notation, we will also use the three terms E, U and R to denote the random variables corresponding to the respective sets.
As the first step of the proof, we will now show that given the message symbols as side information, an eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. Under the temporary assumption that the eavesdropper has access to all message symbols, the linearity of the code as in (46) allows the eavesdropper to subtract the effect of all message symbols from E * . Denote the resultant ( × d) matrix asẼ * . Definẽ M * as a (d×d) matrix obtained by setting all message symbols in M * to zero. ThusM * has its first rows and first columns identical to that of M * , and zeros elsewhere. Then, given the message symbols, the eavesdropper now has access tõ E * = * eveM * .
Recall the property of * eve that any rows, when restricted to the first columns, are independent. Thus, recovering the R random symbols fromẼ is identical to data reconstruction in a product-matrix MBR code designed for [ñ = n,k = ,d = d] in the absence of security requirements. As a result, given the message symbols, the eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. Hence we have H (R|E, U) = 0.
We will now show that H (E) ≤ R. From the value of R in (27) , it suffices to show that out of the d symbols that the eavesdropper has access to, 
Since M * is symmetric, the ( × ) matrix in (48) is also symmetric. Thus 2 dependencies among the elements of E * can be described by the 2 upper-triangular elements of the expression E * ( * eve ) T − * eve (E * ) T = 0. The linear-independence of the rows of * eve implies that these (−1) 2 (redundant) equations are linearly independent.
Thus the eavesdropper has access to at most d − (−1) 2 independent symbols, i.e.,
The final part of the proof establishes that given (47) and (49) , the eavesdropper obtains no information about the message.
where (50b) follows from (49); (50c) is a result of the fact that every symbol in the system is a function of U and R, resulting in H (E|U, R) = 0; (50d) follows from (47); and (50e) follows from the fact that the random symbols are independent of the message symbols. ] where * and * are corresponding submatrices of * and * , and are sized ( × α) and ( × ) respectively. Further, let * m be the (m × α) submatrix of * , corresponding to the m nodes whose repair operations are also eavesdropped upon. These m nodes are a subset of the set of nodes that constitute the matrix * eve , and hence, * m is a submatrix of * . Let E denote the set of symbols that the eavesdropper has gained access to. Further, let U denote the set of all B * message symbols and let R denote the set of all R = B − B * random symbols introduced at the encoding stage. In the proof, with some abuse of notation, we will also use the three terms E, U and R to denote the random variables corresponding to the respective sets.
Under the repair algorithm of the product-matrix MSR code (see Theorem 21) , E comprises the elements of the ( × α) matrix * M * and the elements of the (d × m) matrix M * ( * m ) T . Following the approach described in Section II-B, we will first show that given the message symbols as side information, an eavesdropper can decode all the random symbols. Next, using the properties of the matrix * and the specific structure of the message matrix M * , we will show that H (E) ≤ R. At this point, the arguments in (50a) to (50g) establish that the eavesdropper obtains no information about the message. 
